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Cleaning Up Krak6w: Poland's
Ecological Crisis and the Political
Economy of International
Environmental Assistance
D. H. Cole t
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, when the Soviet Union imposed communism on
Poland, Joseph Stalin remarked that it was "like fitting a cow with a
saddle." Forty years later the Polish people threw off the saddle and
tumbled the totalitarian regime that had mercilessly ridden their backs.
Within a six month's period during 1989 the outlawed Solidarity trade
union was legalized, free elections were held,1 and a non-Communist
government came to power. But when it took office in August 1989 the
Solidarity government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki had no time
to savor its momentous achievement. Poland's centrally planned
economy, suffering from years of mismanagement, was collapsing.
The Polish economic crisis has been well documented-a $39 billion
foreign debt, hyperinflation, stagnant production, and a rapidly declining
standard of living. The Mazowiecki government pleaded with Western
nations for $10 billion in immediate economic assistance; the West
responded with promises of grants and loans amounting to nearly $9
billion.2 This infusion of hard currency may help resuscitate Poland's
t Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School, Stanford, California; Assistant Professor
of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana (Aug. 1991). The author
wishes to express gratitude to Dr. Piotr Glinski of the Polish Academy of Sciences for his
comments, suggestions, and corrections on drafts of Section II of this article. Professors
John H. Barton and Barton H. Thompson of Stanford Law School, and Professor Michael
C. Blumm of the Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College, provided the author
with helpful advice and comments throughout the project. The views expressed herein are
those of the author.
1. In reality, the elections were only semi-free; only a certain percentage of seats in
the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament) were open for contest. In addition, free
elections for local and regional political positions were not held until mid-1990.
2. As of this writing, the United States has promised over $900 million, Germany has
pledged $2.2 billion, Britain is sending $100 million, France has promised $642 million,
and the European Community is sending $1 billion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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moribund economy but will do little to relieve another malady afflicting not
only Poland's fiscal well-being, but the health of her citizens.
Poland has been called the most polluted country in the world.'
During the decades of Communist rule, industrial development and full
employment were exclusive priorities. Environmental degradation was
virtually ignored; according to socialist theory, pollution was a
phenomenon of industrial capitalism that would simply vanish under com-
prehensive central planning." Meanwhile, air and water quality steadily
deteriorated to a point where today public health is seriously threatened.
The Polish government finally acknowledged it had a pollution prob-
lem in 1980.1 For the next decade, under mounting pressure from the
Polski Klub Ekologiczny (Polish Ecological Club), a nonpolitical associa-
and World Bank will lend Poland a combined $2.37 billion over the next eighteen months,
and Japan has offered $1 billion in aid to Poland and Hungary. See respectively Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5401-5495 (1990); Clamour in the
East: A Good Will Trip Ends; Kohl Recalls Auschwitz andAgrees to Aid Poles, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1989, § A, at 14, col. 1 (late ed.); Riding, Upheaval in the East; Aid to Poland and
Hungary Pledged by Western Nations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, § A, at 22, col. 1 (late
ed.); Bonn Giving Poles Aid of $1 Billion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 5 (late
ed.); Glad Tidings for Poland and Hungary, Fin. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, § I, at 2; Barber,
World Bank is Ready to Lend 1.7 Billion Dollars to Poland, Fin. Times, Dec. 8, 1989, § I,
at 6; Farnsworth, Upheaval in the East; I.M.F. Backs Poland's Effort for Western Aid, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1989, § A, at 17, col. 1 (late ed.); Protzman, Upheaval in the East; Japanese
Aid; $1 Billion Plan for Poland and Hungary, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 4
(late ed.).
Not all of these grants and loans will be immediately forthcoming. Some, like the US
aid, will come over a two- or three-year period. Most recently, the Western industrialized
nations and Japan established a new development bank to finance private enterprises in
Eastern Europe. See Greenhouse, Upheaval in the East: Aid From the West; New Bank to
Help East Bloc Revive Its Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, § 1, pt. 1, at 14, col. 1 (late
ed.).
3. See Soderlind, Polish Pollution: Literally a Matter ofSurvival, U.P.I., Feb. 9, 1986
(NEXIS. Omni file); Foreign News Briefs, U.PI., Sept. 13, 1986 (NEXIS, Omni file).
4. See Kabala, Poland: Facing the Hidden Costs of Development, ENV'T, Nov. 1985,
at 6, 38. See generally J. FULLENBACH, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EAST AND
WEST (1981); Hansmeyer & Rrup, Umweltgefdhrdung und Gesellschaftssystem, 11
WIRTSCHAFrsPoLrriScHE CImONIK 7 (1973).
During the 1960s and 1970s the Polish government did enact legislation apparently
intended to avert environmental degradation. See, e.g., Water Act of Jan. 31, 1961; Council
of Ministers' Regulation of Sept. 13, 1966 [establishing admissible levels for somepollutants
in the atmosphere]; Law of April 21, 1965 [on air pollution protection]; Council of Ministers'
Regulation No. 18 of Jan. 31, 1970 [on protection of forests from air pollution]. See
generally W. BRZEzINSKI, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN POLAND
(1974). However, the Polish government never intended its environmental protection
measures to take precedence over its primary goals of full employment and full development.
See Kabala, supra, at 8, 39. And, even if the various measures constituted a good faith effort
by the government to control pollution, the present state of Poland's ecological crisis
(detailed in Section II) demonstrates conclusively that those efforts were wholly insufficient
and ineffective.
5. See Fura, The Polish Ecological Club, ENV'T, Nov. 1985, at 4.
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tion of professionals, intellectuals, farmers, and workers, General Woj-
ciech Jaruzelski's regime initiated some studies of environmental harm but
took little constructive action before its fall from power.6 As a result, the
new, democratically elected Polish government faces an acute ecological
crisis. The economic costs alone are staggering. According to a 1987
government study, air and water pollution cost the Polish economy over
800 billion zlotych ($3.4 billion) annually, or 10 percent of the gross
national income.7 This fiscal burden, coupled with equally impressive
social, health, recreational, and aesthetic costs, describes an ecological
crisis of truly dangerous proportions, one that will require at least two
decades to reverse." The problem has attracted international attention, and
its abatement cannot be accomplished without substantial international
cooperation.
This article examines Poland's ecological crisis and the potential for
international economic and technological assistance. First, I assess
Poland's crisis, focusing on the causes and effects of environmental
degradation in the medieval city of Krak6w, one of the world's most
beautiful and historically significant cities. I then analyze the economic
factors impeding Poland's ability to manage the problem itself, and, next,
explore plausible strategies for funding and implementing international
assistance. To be effective, environmental assistance plans must use the
common channels of international trade. However, they can be funded in
various ways, including outright grants, debt conversion schemes, and
perhaps a new multilateral environmental clean-up fund. The choice of
funding is not academic; outright grants entail different economic and
political consequences for the grantor and for Poland than debt conver-
sions, for example. Finally, I discuss the politics and economics of inter-
national environmental assistance generally and evaluate the aid already
flowing into Poland from different countries.
This article does not argue for or against international environmental
assistance to Poland,9 but evaluates the prospects for and ramifications of
6. There was at least one notable exception. In 1980 the Skawina aluminum smelter
near Krak6w was closed following protests by workers and the Polish Ecological Club.
News Brief, ENG. & MINING J., May 1982. at 13 (NEXIS, EMJ file); Fura, supra note 5, at 5.
7. Kabala, Environmental Deterioration and Public Health, Radio Free Eur./Rep. E.
Eur., Oct. 5, 1990, at 27, 30.
8. In 1985 the Polish government estimated that the necessary environmental cleanup
would take at least twenty years. See Environment Minister Details Vast Pollution Problem
in Poland, Reuters N. Eur. Service, June 20, 1985 (NEXIS, Omni file). For complete
descriptions of the various costs of Poland's ecological crisis, see infra Section I.
9. However, there are compelling moral, historical, and geographical reasons for the
international community to provide a high level of environmental aid to Poland. For
example, the West's irresponsible lending of credits in the 1970s was a substantial cause of
the debt crisis that has nearly bankrupted Poland. See, e.g., R. PORTES, THE POtaSH CRISIS:
1991)
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assistance. The various members of the international community can be
expected to provide environmental aid commensurate with their national
self-interests. Needy countries may receive a modicum of support in the
form of disaster relief, but any large and sustained financing of environ-
mental assistance will require some political or economic "return" on the
"investment." This conclusion has important political, economic, and legal
policy implications for Poland and other severely polluted countries unable
to manage without substantial foreign assistance.
II. POLAND'S ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
Poland is east-central Europe's largest country, with a land area of
120,350 square miles (about half the size of Texas). A vast fertile plain,
Poland extends from eastern Germany in the west to the Soviet Union in
the east. Its main river, the Wisla, flows the length of the country from the
Tatras Mountains on Poland's southern border with Czechoslovakia,
through the historic capital of Krak6w and the modem capital of Warszawa
(Warsaw), to the Baltic Sea at Gdansk.
Before World War II Poland was a predominantly agricultural nation
with a widely dispersed populace. After the war it developed rapidly into
one of the most industrialized nations in the world. Today, approximately
60 percent of its 38 million inhabitants live in the major industrial centers
of Warszawa, Krak6w, Katowice, Gdansk, L6dz, Szczecin, and Wroclaw.
More than half that number are in imminent peril from severe air and water
pollution.
The Polish government has officially listed twenty-seven "ecological
danger zones," encompassing 11 percent of the nation's territory and 35
percent of its citizens. 10 The worst of these danger zones are in southern
Poland, in the neighboring woiw6dstwa (provinces) of Katowice (in the
area historically known as Silesia) and Krak6w (bordering Silesia in
western Galicia," also known as Malopolska). Katowice is Poland's
largest industrial province. Although it constitutes only 3 percent of
WESTERN ECONOMIC POLCY OPTIONS 15 (1981). As a result, there are no funds available
for environmental cleanup. In addition, Polish pollution is a transboundary, and therefore
international, problem. See infra notes 191-192, 195-196 and accompanying text. Finally,
and most importantly, people are suffering and dying in Poland from pollution-related
causes.
10. Soderlind, supra note 3.
11. Some journalists have erroneously stated or implied that Krak6w is in Silesia; in
many cases discussing pollution problems in Silesia, they quite clearly intend to include
Krak6w. See, e.g., Booker, The East's Silent Sickness, Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989, at
15 (NEXIS, Omni file); Forbes, Poland Grapples With Pollution Crisis, Reuters N. Eur.
Service, Aug. 23, 1985 (NEXIS, Omni file).
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Poland's land area, it is home to more than 10 percent of the nation's
people. Its 1,700 industries, mining operations, and other enterprises
generate almost one-third of the country's total annual income. 12 Not
coincidentally, the region produces an equally huge share of Poland's
pollution. While Katowice is the industrial heart of Poland, Poland's jewel
is forty miles east-Krak6w, the medieval city of kings.
A. Krak6w and Environs
In 1978 the United Nations declared Krak6w, Poland's third-largest
city (population 500,000), a World Heritage Site to be preserved as a
cultural treasure for all mankind.13 Founded in the eleventh century,
Krak6w served as Poland's capital for nearly 500 years, until 1596. Its
Jagiellonian University, founded in 1399, is Eastern Europe's second
oldest (after Prague), and its town square is the second largest in all Europe.
The quantity and quality of its Gothic and Renaissance architecture are
unparalleled. In the words of Czeslaw Milosz, Poland's Nobel Prize-win-
ning poet, Krak6w is "one solid museum. ' 14 Indeed, it was "solid" enough
to withstand the vicissitudes of World War II virtually unscathed-but now
it is literally dissolving in the rain.
Krak6w sits in a damp valley in south-central Poland, with Katowice
to the west, the Tatras Mountains to the south, and the huge Lenin Steel-
works in neighboring Nowa Huta (the town's name means "new steel-
works") to the northeast. About 50 percent of Krak6w's air pollution is
homegrown; the rest is carried on the prevailing winds from Katowice,
Czechoslovakia, and Germany.1 5 Airborne chemicals linger in the stag-
nant, humid air above Krak6w until the rains carry them to earth, turning
the city, in the words of one Polish scientist, into a virtual "chemical
cauldron." 6
B. The Degradation of Krak6w: Sources of the Pollution Problem
Poland's pollution problems stem primarily from four sources: (1)
industry; (2) mining operations; (3) inadequate sewage treatment; and (4)
agricultural chemical runoff.
12. Fura, supra note 5, at 4. See also W. BRzEzINsIu, supra note 4, at 119.
13. See Soderlind, supra note 3; Hinrichsen, In Krak6w Even the Buildings Dissolve,
INT'L WILDLIFE, Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 12, 13.
14. C. MILosz, THE HISTORY OF POLISH LrrERATURE 353 (1969).
15. Thus, according to Zygmunt Fura, former president of the Krak6w branch of the
Polish Ecological Club, the situation in Krak6w is, in many respects, worse than in Katowice,
where much of the pollution originates. Fura, supra note 5, at 4. In addition, in 1985, the
Polish government asserted that 60 percent of Poland's air pollution originated in southern
and western Europe. Environment Minister Details Vast Pollution Problem in Poland, supra
note 8.
16. See Hinrichsen, supra note 13, at 14.
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1. Industrial Pollution
Industry is the primary source of pollution in Krak6w and throughout
Poland, producing 65 percent of the nation's air effluents; transportation
produces most of the other 35 percent. 17 The vast majority of Poland's
industries run on domestically mined, high-sulfur coal. 8 Unfortunately,
too few Polish industries have pollution-control devices. 19 They release
sulfur directly into the atmosphere where it combines with oxygen atoms
to produce sulfur dioxide (S02), a major source of acid rain.
The problem is most evident in Silesia, which produces most of the
nation's coal, one-third of its coke, one-half of its steel, and one-third of its
electricity.? As a by-product, its industries release up to 1,000 metric tons
of S02 per kilometer.2' Put in more comprehensible terms, the industrial
belt of Silesia releases five times as much S02 per square mile as the
industrial belt of West Germany's Ruhr Valley, one of greatest sources of
air pollution in Western Europe.22 Nationwide, Polish industries produce
up to 4 million metric tons of S02 each year, more than four times the total
US S02 emissions per square mile.2?
Besides noxious gases, Polish industries also emit dust containing
heavy metals (lead, cadmium, zinc, uranium, and copper) that ultimately
fall to earth and contaminate food and water supplies. In 1979 Krak6w's
Lenin Steelworks alone emitted dust containing seven tons of cadmium,
170 tons of lead, 470 tons of zinc, and 18,000 tons of iron.? Tests on soil
samples from the region indicated levels of lead and cadmium that were the
17. See Fura, supra note 5, at 4. In addition, coal fires used for heating houses and
apartments are an important source of pollution in places like the Stare Miasto (Old Town)
section of Krak6w. Hughes, Energy Policy and the Environment in Poland, EUR. ECON.,
Mar. 1990, at 151, 163.
18. Domestically mined coal supplies 80 percent of Poland's energy. Oil and natural
gas imported primarily from the Soviet Union make up most of the other 20 percent. Kabala,
supra note 4, at 10. There is also some hydropower production in Poland.
19. As of 1966 fewer than half of 1,770 industrial plants, mines, etc., in the Katowice




22. Hinrichsen, supra note 13, at 14.
23. See Kabala, supra note 4, at 11. In absolute terms, the US releases far more S02
into the atmosphere-23 million tons (about 20.86 million metric tons) in 1990-than
Poland. On US emission levels, see Inventory of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Issued; Will
Form Basis for Cuts in Clean Air Measure, [Current Reports] 20 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
1430 (1989). However, the United States is thirty times larger than Poland and has 6.5 times
as many inhabitants.
24. Soderlind, supra note 3. It should be noted, however, that emissions from Nowa
Huta have declined throughout the 1980s because the plant switched to lower-sulfur coal
and production declined during Poland's decade-long economic downturn. Id.
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highest ever recorded anywhere in the world, up to 200 times the maximum
considered safe by the Polish govemment.'
2. Pollution from Mining Operations
Coal mining causes special environmental problems. In their efforts
to supply the nation's energy needs, miners continually pump untreated,
highly salinized water from the coal pits into local rivers. Their continual
pumping also lowers the water table, causing area farmlands to dry up and
subside. Between 1975 and 1981 subsidence destroyed 300,000 parcels of
land. In some places land sank as much as twenty meters (about seventy
feet).6
3. Inadequate Sewage Treatment
Poland's foremost ecological problem is water qualityY The Wisla,
which for centuries carried Polish products to the world, has become "a
garbage carrier from Silesia to the Baltic Sea." Of Poland's 800 cities,
only half have sewage treatment facilities.2 Almost half the 4.6 billion
tons of sewage disgorged into Polish rivers each year is entirely untreated,
and most of the rest only partially treated ° Amazingly, until 1989 the
nation's capital and largest city, Warszawa, had no sewage treatment
facilities; each day Warszawa would pour a million cubic meters of un-
treated sewage into the Wisla.1' When Warszawa's first sewage treatment
plant opened in 1989, serving about one-third of the city on the east bank
of the Wisla, it had to be shut down almost immediately because of
operating difficulties. It reopened in 1990.
4. Agricultural Chemical Run-off
Chemical run-off from farmland aggravates Poland's water problem.
For nearly three decades Polish governments have sought to modernize
agriculture in order to increase food production to meet the needs of the
vast urban work forces spawned by its development programs. One aspect
of this modernization, the increased use of chemicals, is substantially
responsible for polluting virtually every river in the country, as well as the
25. Kabala, supra note 4, at 12; Hinrichsen, supra note 13, at 14.
26. Interview with Piotr Glinski, Polish Academy of Sciences, in Stanford, Cal. (Jan.
21, 1990)[hereinafter Interview].
27. Kabala, supra note 4, at 9.
28. Soderlind, supra note 3; see also Booker, supra note 11.
29. Soderlind, supra note 3. In addition, 30 percent of Poland's factories have no
effective sewer system. Wyrzykowski, Przyroda Ojczysta--Powolna Agonia (Mother
Nature-Slow Agony) (trans. by author), Przeglad Polski, Sept. 14, 1989, at 5. Eighty
percent of water used by industry is returned as waste. W. BRZEZINsKi, supra note 4, at 80.
30. Forbes, supra note 11.
31. See id.
1991]
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
Baltic coastal waters, with nitrogen- and phosphorous-contaminated
runoff.32
C. The Effects of Pollution in Krakdw
The environmental consequences for Krak6w of Poland's myopic
development are no different in kind from the experiences of US cities such
as Los Angeles or New York; it is simply a matter of degree. However,
differences in degree can be, and in this case are, profound.
1. Air Quality
Like Los Angeles, Krak6w (and hundreds of square miles around it)
lies "under a permanent poisonous smog" that makes breathing difficult.3
Unlike Los Angeles', Krak6w's smog is so heavy that "the area gets 20
percent less sunlight than other parts of Poland." Each day water trucks
drive about the city, spraying the streets to keep the dust down.35 But the
dust continues to fall at an annual rate of 550 tons per square kilometer,
more than twice the maximum limit for safety set by the government. 6
Throughout Silesia and western Galicia, "the sulfuric and nitric acids
which fall with each rain have so corroded the railway tracks that trains are
not allowed to go more than 40 km per hour (25 mph)." r
a. Aesthetic costs: effects on architecture
The damages inflicted on the city's historical legacy-its art and
architecture-may be among the most significant effects of air pollution on
living conditions in Krak6w. "The castle and cathedral on Krak6w's
Wawel hill, once the seat of Poland's kings, are withering away at a rate of
2.5 millimeters per decade." Acid rain ate away so much of the
cathedral's gold roof that it recently had to be completely replaced. 9
Wawel Castle's centuries-old statues no longer have faces; steeples have
fallen off churches; and these days, "the view down every street is dis-
rupted by the scaffolding of workers trying to hold the buildings
32. Kabala, supra note 4, at 8.
33. Booker, supra note 11.
34. Forbes, supra note 11.
35. Timberlake, Poland--the Most Polluted Country in the World?, 92 NEw SCIENTIST
248, 249 (1981).
36. Wyrzykowski, supra note 29, at 5.
37. Timberlake, supra note 35, at 248.
38. Soderlind, supra note 3.
39. Timberlake, supra note 35, at 249. The gold was transformed into soluble
chlorides by acid rain and fluorine gas, which combine to form a highly corrosive mixture
of hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acids.
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together."4 In total, some 80 percent of Krak6w's most valued buildings
require immediate renovation. 4'
In addition to the purely aesthetic costs of Krak6w's rapid disintegra-
tion, the psychological effect on the Polish people is devastating. In the
words of Piotr Glinski, environmental sociologist from the Polish
Academy of Sciences: "It hurts our feelings to watch the destruction of the
nation's cultural identity. 42
b. Effects on agriculture
Air pollution also has an immense impact on agriculture in the
Krak6w area and throughout the country. By 1985, 50 percent of Poland's
forests were affected by exposure to air pollution and acid rain;43 180,000
hectares (450,000 acres) of evergreen forests in the Katowice region were
reported to be dead or dying. Scientists predicted a loss of up to 3 million
hectares (7.5 million acres) of trees over the next twenty years, at a cost of
120 billion zlotych ($1.5 billion)." The Nowa Huta steelworks alone are
responsible for killing more than 25 percent of the trees in the 11,000
hectares (27.5 thousand acres) of the Niepolomicka forest outside
Krak6w. "
The situation is no better on the farm. In 1980 a group of scientists,
mostly from the Polish Ecological Club, recommended that 17 percent of
Silesia's farmland be taken out of production because of the dangerous
buildup of heavy metals on vegetation and in the soil.46 On the small farms
near Krak6w, "10 percent of the cattle suffered from fluorosis, and the
farmers had to give up growing sugar beet because the leaves, used as
fodder, poisoned livestock."47 Vegetables grown in the area contain 2.4
times more uranium, 134 times more lead, 21 times more copper, 220 times
more cadmium, and 165 times more zinc than "normal." 4 As a result, 60
40. Id.
41. Soderlind, supra note 3. According to one study, construction materials in Krak6w
"decay up to 40 times more rapidly than they ought to." Lemiski, The Environmental Crisis,
Radio Free Eur./Rep. E. Eur., Aug. 31, 1990, at 26.
42. Interview, supra note 26.
43. Environment Minister Details Vast Pollution Problem in Poland, supra note 8.
44. See Kabala, supra note 4, at 12. Amounts are expressed in 1980 values.
45. Id.
46. Timberlake, supra note 35, at 248.
47. Id. at 249.
48. Soderlind, supra note 3. It is not at all clear how the Polish government or the
Polish Ecological Club defines what is normal. However, in another study, samples of
garden soil taken in the Katowice region registered concentrations of lead, zinc, cadmium,
and mercury that exceeded World Health Organization standards by 30 to 70 percent.
Kabala, supra note 4, at 12.
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percent of all food produced in the Krak6w area may be unfit for human
consumption. 9
2. Water Quality
Krak6w's water pollution problems are even worse than those caused
by air pollution. The stretch of the Wisla that flows through the city is
"virtually devoid of biological life."0 Like more than 60 percent of the
rivers in neighboring Katowice woiw6dstwo this stretch is unfit for any use,
except as a sewer.5 It cannot be used even for industrial purposes because
the chemicals and metals in the water accelerate wear and tear on
machinery. 52
Water quality is little better in the rest of Poland. According to the
World Bank's Director of East European operations, Eugenio F. Lan, 95
percent of Poland's drinking water is polluted. 53 Seventy percent of the
water supply poses an immediate threat to human health.5 Nationwide,
more than 40 percent of river water is too polluted for any use.55 This is
true for 60 percent of the Wisla; 635 of its 1,068 kilometers are so polluted
that the water is unfit even for industrial purposes. 6
With Poland's rivers so highly polluted, it is no surprise to find their
ultimate destination, the Baltic Sea, also severely degraded. In fact, the
Baltic is "one of the most heavily trafficked and polluted bodies of water in
the world." As a result, "Poland's Baltic coastal waters are virtually
unusable for recreation."5" Some summers, up to twenty-seven miles of the
most popular beaches along the Baltic coast are closed because chemicals
in the water cause skin infections.59
D. The Health Consequences of Pollution in Krak6w
The health effects of Poland's pollution are certainly not restricted to
skin infections resulting from exposure to waters off the Baltic coast and
psychological injuries stemming from the disintegration of Krak6w's old
buildings. Today the physical and mental health of almost every Pole is
threatened by pollution-related diseases and conditions. The effects are
49. Ember, Pollution Chokes East-BlocNations, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, Apr. 16, 1990,
at 7.
50. Kabala, supra note 4, at 9.
51. W. BRZEziNsKi, supra note 4, at 80.
52. Id. at 81.
53. Farnsworth, supra note 2.
54. See Wyrzykowski, supra note 29.
55. Kabala, supra note 4, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id.
59. Forbes, supra note 11.
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most pronounced in the highly industrialized regions of Krak6w and
Katowice.
The current average life expectancy in Poland, as a whole, is 71.5
years. Life expectancy in Silesia and western Galicia is two years less. 60
An estimated 70 percent of these regions' inhabitants live in health-
threatening conditions. They suffer from "15 percent more disease of the
circulation, 30 percent more tumors and 47 percent more respiratory dis-
ease than other Poles." 61 The cancer rate is 30 percent higher than the
national average.6 2 Twenty-four percent of Poland's occupational illnesses
occur in Krak6w.3 The inhabitants of Krak6w and Katowice also suffer
comparatively high rates of heart defects, pneumonia, premature births,
and miscarriages.6 Nationwide, doctors predict that one Pole in four will
contract some form of pollution-related cancer by the year 2000.6
The most frightening statistics concern the very youngest members of
Polish society, those who are the most susceptible to pollution-related
disease. "Krak6w has Poland's highest infant mortality-258 per 100,000
live births, compared to the national average of 184 per 100,000."66 "Two-
thirds of all children in Silesia suffer by the age of ten from serious mental
and physical disabilities." 6 This explains why fifty-four of Poland's 102
schools for the disabled are in Katowice.6 Overall, in physical and mental
development, children from the industrial belt are two to three years behind
children raised in areas remote from the sources of pollution.69 Throughout
Poland the childhood leukemia rate has doubled during the last decade. 70
These statistics, as grim as they are, do not begin to paint a complete
picture of the unlivable conditions in Silesia and western Galicia. Each
60. Id. By contrast, life expectancy in West Germany and the United States averages
between seventy-four and seventy-six years.
61. Timberlake, supra note 35, at 248.
62. Forbes, supra note 11.
63. Dublin, East Europe's Legacy of Death, Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1990, at 2
(NEXIS, Omni file).
64. Wyrzykowski, supra note 29, at 5; see also Smog zabija naprawde (Smog Really
Kills), Gazeta Wyborcza, June 21, 1990, at2 [hereinafter Smog zabija naprawde] (trans. by
author).
65. Dublin, supra note 63.
66. Soderlind, supra note 3. Infant mortality in the United States is ten per 10,000 live
births, little more than half of Poland's national rate.
67. Booker, supra note 11. See also Smog zabija naprawde, supra note 64. In total,
60,000 children suffer from pollution-related mental and/or physical disabilities. Of these,
some 20 percent are born retarded. Swedish Government to Give Poland $45 Million for
EnvironmentalActivities, [Current Reports] 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 541 (1989).
68. Timberlake, supra note 35, at 248.
69. McIntyre, Popular Protest Over Pollution Growing in East Europe, Reuter Lib.
Rep., May 20, 1988 (NExis, Omni file).
70. Dublin, supra note 63.
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day, hundreds of men, women, and children suffering from pollution-re-
lated respiratory ailments descend 650 feet below the earth's surface, down
an old abandoned mine shaft, for treatment: it is the only place near
Krak6w with air clean enough to breathe deeply. 71 Air pollution in
Katowice has grown so severe that the regional government recently con-
sidered issuing 100,000 gas masks to area residents.72 And when the rains
fall in southern Poland, everything turns black-the sky, the streets, even
the people.
EI. POLAND'S INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND OTHER IM-
PEDIMENTS TO A WHOLLY DOMESTIC SOLUTION TO THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 3
Poland's democratically elected government is well aware of the
effects pollution is having on the health of the Polish people and their
ukochany kraj (beloved country). In fact, a blueprint exists for environ-
mental reclamation and protection. In March 1989, during the same
roundtable negotiations that led to Solidarity's re-legalization, the union's
negotiators and representatives of the Jaruzelski regime signed a protocol
on the environment that established laudable goals for improvement but
contained few specifics on funding.74
In an article he wrote just after taking office, Prime Minister
Mazowiecki addressed the ecological crisis and the Polish government's
fiscal constraints:
[G]iven the nation's singularly difficult financial situation, the scope of
possible governmental assistance is limited; it is not enough for the
needs that have arisen. We must consider boldly removing administra-
tive barriers, ending inappropriate human activities, and promote
genuine community initiative to accomplish this, for the state cannot be
expected to do the impossible by itself.75
He emphasized that the country would need "assistance in environ-
mental protection from the more advanced nations of the world." '76
71. Simons, Upheaval in the East; Rising Iron Curtain Exposes Haunting Veil of
Polluted Air, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
72. Polish Government, Alarmed by Pollution, Considers Gas Masks, Chicago Trib.,
July 24, 1990, at 5.
73. Because of the rapid changes in Poland's economic situation over the past several
months, often the only available sources for information appearing in this section are
newspaper accounts, which are not always reliable. I have tried to point out questionable
facts and figures where they occur.
74. See Protokol Podzespolu d/s EkologiiOkraglego Stolu (Report of the RoundTable
Subunit on Ecology) (SC1TRAN trans. Mar. 1989).
75. Mazowiecki, Przychodzejako czlowiek "Solidarnosci" (He Comes as a Man of




International assistance is indispensable for two reasons. First,
Poland's international debt of $40 billion and domestic economic stagna-
tion have pushed the country to the brink of insolvency; there are virtually
no zlotych available for environmental reclamation and protection.
Second, Poland wants the technology and simple construction materials
needed for effective environmental clean-up, restoration, and protection.
A. Poland's International'Debt and Economic Woes
Immediately following World War II, Soviet-dominated Poland trans-
formed rapidly from a largely agrarian society to an urban, industrial
society. During the 1950s and 1960s Poland received some long-term
credits from Western governments, including the United States, but as-
sumed no "larger debts.'" Then, in the 1970s the Polish government
initiated an immense and imprudent program of economic development,
financed entirely by Western governments and commercial banks. The
enduring legacy of this so-called "new development strategy" is a $39
billion debt, the fourth largest in the world.78 Negotiations are under way
to reschedule Polish debt repayments. 79 Meanwhile, the nation is strug-
gling to rebuild an almost bankrupt domestic economy.
Since 1981 Poland's gross national product (GNP) has grown at an
average annual rate of less than 1 percent8° with per capita GNP of less than
$6,000 per year (1987 figures).8 Until economic reforms took effect in
1990, national income did not match government expenditures. In 1989
77. Rydzkowski & Zoladkiewicz, Polish International Debt: Prospects for Repay-
ment, 23 EAST EuR. Q. 211, 211 (Summer 1989). See also R. PORTES, supra note 9, at 4.
78. See R. PORTES, supra note 9, at 4-10; see also Farnsworth, Incentives for Warsaw:
Washington Offers Help for a Price, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1989, § 4, at 2, col. 1. Poland's
largest creditors are West Germany ($5.8 billion), France ($3.2 billion), Austria ($2.7
billion), the United States ($2.4 billion), Great Britain ($2.2 billion), Canada ($2 billion),
Brazil ($1.6 billion), Japan ($1.4 billion), Italy ($1.3 billion), and Switzerland ($0.7 billion).
79. See, e.g., Polish Debt Talks Held, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, § C, at 16 [hereinafter
Polish Debt Talks Held]. As this article goes to press Group of Seven Industrialized Nations
on March 15, 1991 forgave 50 percent of $30.8 billion Poland owed member countries.
Risen, Western Nations Reward Poland by Halving Its Debt, L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1991, §
D, at 1. The US unilaterally slashed an additional 20 percent of its Polish debt holdings.
See Krauss, Bush Greets Walesa with Debt Relief, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1991, § A, at 3.
80. Uchitelle, East Europe Tries a Mild Capitalism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989, § D,
at 1, col. 3. By the end of the 1980s the GNP was falling, by 1.6 percent in 1988 and a
projected 3 percent in 1990. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, EASTERN EUROPE: LONG
ROAD TO ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, REP. TO THE SUBCOMM. ON TECH. AND NAT'L SECURITY
OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM. OF CONG., May 16, 1990, Table 1 [hereinafter CIA REPORT].
For purposes of comparison, US GNP rose at an average annual rate of 3.2 percent between
1981 and 1989. Id.
81. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1989, § A, at 11. Poland's per capita GNP for 1989 was
$4,565. CIA REPORT, supra note 80, Figure 1. This amounts only to about 22 percent of
the US 1989 per capita GNP of $19,197.
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the Polish deficit amounted to 30 percent of the total budget. 2 While
interest payments on foreign debts contributed to the deficit, its primary
cause was government expenditures to subsidize industry and support
prices.13 To cover those expenditures, the government printed worthless
money, sparking hyperinflation.84 Through the end of 1989 prices of basic
commodities rose by "more than 50 percent per month, and in some cases
by several hundred percent."85 For the month of July 1989 alone, costs
increased by 10 percent over the preceding month and by 85 percent over
the first seven months of 1988; food deliveries were down 20 percent from
the previous year, industrial deliveries decreased by an average of 11
percent from 1988; and total available housing, already in short supply,"
fell by 5 percent.87 As 1989 ended, inflation was running at an annual rate
of 900 percent."
To curtail runaway inflation and convert the Polish economy to a
market base, the Solidarity government pushed through the Sejm (parlia-
ment) a spate of legislation that took effect on January 1, 1990. These laws
were intended to balance the budget immediately by slashing all subsidies
by one-half, decontrolling prices for most consumer goods, limiting wage
increases, and reducing inflation compensation from 100 to 80 percent. 9
In addition, the Polish government planned to establish a convertible
currency and to sell off most state-owned enterprises.9
In time, the government's austerity measures and move to a market-
based economy should raise the abysmal standard of living in Poland, the
second lowest in what was the Eastern bloc. Throughout the last decade
Poles earned (in real terms) less and less, while prices steadily increased. 91
In 1989 real disposable per capita income was (1989 US) $99.92 In addi-
82. Tagliabue, Poland's Hard Times Deepen, Dampening Hopes for Change, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 3.
83. Id.
84. Sachs, Helping Poland Help Itself, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1989, § A, at 25, col. 1.
85. Id.
86. In some parts of Poland, the waiting period for housing now exceeds fifty years.
Wechsler, A Grand Experiment, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 1989, at 59, 60.
87. Lloyd, Radical Challenge for Solidarity, Fin. Times, Aug. 30, 1989, § I, at 16.
88. Upheaval in the East; Poles Hear Plan for Radical Shift in Their Economy, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 18, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter Upheaval in the East; Poles Hear Plan].
89. See id.; Murray, The Outlook: Polish Economic Plan is Boldly Capitalistic, Wall
St. J., Dec. 4, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Tagliabue, Poland Passes Bill to Offset Inflation, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 1.
90. See Upheaval in the East; Poles Hear Plan, supra note 88. The National Bank
has already made the zloty convertible. In October 1989 it devalued the Polish currency by
14.7 percent against the dollar. Tagliabue, supra note 89. As of July 1990 it was holding
its value against the dollar. Engelberg, Evolution in Europe, Lower House Approves Bill to
Make Citizens Stockholders, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1990, § 1, at 1, Col. 3.
91. See Wechsler, supra note 86, at 72-73.
92. CIA REPORT. supra note 79, at Table C-14.
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tion, because of hyperinflation, these eamings found ever-fewer goods to
purchase; producers routinely withheld commodities from market an-
ticipating still-higher prices.93 When goods were available, buyers fre-
quently could not afford them. According to a report prepared for the US
House of Representatives' Committee on Small Business, fully 60 percent
of Polish wage earners could not make ends meet.Y
In 1990 life grew even more difficult for most Poles. Within twenty-
four hours after the Solidarity government's new austerity program took
effect, the price of coal rose 600 percent, electricity costs quadrupled, and
the price of gasoline doubled.95 Over several months prices stabilized. By
May 1990 inflation was down to an annualized rate of 4 percent; but while
goods and food were more readily available in stores, the prices were
beyond the means of most Poles.96
As the government sells off state-owned industries and allows others
to go bankrupt pursuant to the economic reform program, Poland confronts
a new economic problem-unemployment, which is expected to reach
between 5 and 10 percent. 97 Advisors from the Bush administration are
presently helping the Polish government design systems of unemployment
compensation and job retraining.
The privatization process also affects Polish pollution levels. Allow-
ing inefficient industries to go bankrupt eliminates sources of pollution.
For example, bankruptcy at the huge Lenin Steelworks in Nowa Huta
would eliminate the single largest source of air pollution in Poland while
adding 30,000 workers to the unemployment rolls. Since austerity
measures took effect on January 1, 1990, abolishing subsidies and causing
93. Wechsler, supra note 86, at 77.
94. HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BusIEss, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., ECONOMIC REsTRuc-
TURING IN EASTERN EUROPE: AMERICAN INTERESTS 8 (1989).
95. Food prices also skyrocketed. Greenhouse, An Economic Overhaul Has Poland
Grumbling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, § D, at 6, col. 1. Even the price of a simple bus ticket
rose by 250 percent. Greenhouse, Upheaval in the East: Warsaw; Poland Raising Basic
Prices Sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, § A, at 13, col. 1.
96. Warsaw, Faulted by Walesa, Declares Market Conversion Complete, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1990, § A, at 9, col. 1 [hereinafter Market Conversion]. In addition, the zloty had
held its value against the dollar, and the nation had amassed a $2 billion trade surplus. At
the same time, however, production was down 28 percent from the previous year. See
Engelberg, supra note 90. Real income dropped 26 percent through the first nine months
of 1990. Najbardziej zdrozaly uslugi (Service Prices Increase the Most), Gazeta Wyborcza,
Oct. 13-14, 1990, at 2 (trans. by author).
97. This is really not a new problem. Like other nations of the Eastern Bloc, Poland
for years has suffered from so-called shadow unemployment-a single job was assigned to
more than one employee. Harvard economist and Solidarity advisor Jeffrey Sachs initially
predicted that unemployment would stabilize at about 5 percent. Uchitelle, supra note 80.
More recently, the US Central Intelligence Agency predicted that unemployment could reach
9 percent. CIA REPORT, supra note 80, at 23.
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energy costs to rise 600 percent, S02 emissions have declined nationwide
by 30 percent.98 At the same time, uncertainties over the fate of enterprises
may actually impede pollution-control initiatives, as plant managers
responsible for operations avoid making capital-intensive decisions before
ultimate ownership is determined.
Meanwhile, the Polish government is in no position to expend pre-
cious funds on reclaiming and protecting the environment as it attempts to
restructure the entire national economy, and its citizens suffer through
"economic shock therapy.' 99 Lawrence Wechsler has asked: Is the govern-
ment, under present circumstances, "more likely to invest in soup kitchens
or in sewage-treatment plants?"'1
B. Lack of Technological and Other Resources Necessary for En-
vironmental Reclamation and Restoration
The acute shortages that plague Poland's economy also obstruct its
efforts at environmental reclamation. In past years, funds allocated for
environmental protection went unspent for lack of pollution-control equip-
ment to purchase. 101 The problem is not limited to high-technology equip-
ment. In 1986 an official from Krak6w's buildings preservation depart-
ment commented: "We get enough money from the government, but it is
hard to come by construction material. And there is so much to be repaired
that we cannot keep pace with the destruction.'
10 2
Clearly, the Polish government cannot clean up Krak6w unless the
international community provides substantial funding, technological assis-
tance (primarily in the form of pollution-control equipment), and enough
construction materials to do the job.
98. Clover, West Declares War on East's IndustrialLegacy ofDeath, Daily Telegraph,
June 18, 1990, at 8 (NEXIS, Omni file).
99. See Greenhouse, "Shock Therapy" for Poland: JoltMight Be Too Damaging, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 26, 1989, § D, at 1, col. 1. As this article was going to press, the Polish
government announced that it plans to spend 16 trillion zlotych (about US $160 million) on
environmental protection in fiscal year 1991. Environmental Minister Holds News Con-
ference, PAP News Wire, Nov. 20, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
100. Wechsler, supra note 86, at 97.
101. Kabala, supra note 4, at 38; see also Ecodevelopment -Poland: Raison d'Etat, The
Warsaw Voice, Nov. 18,1990 (NExis, Omni file) ("Apart from money, Poland needs modem
technology.").
102. Soderlind, supra note 3.
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IV. MEANS OF FINANCING AND IMPLEMENTING INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE
Plausible means for providing international environmental assistance
to Poland are limited. 103 To begin with, there are surprisingly few ways
states can effectively spend their resources abroad. They can write a
check; subsidize foreign purchases of domestically produced goods and
services, or agree, by some other means, to effect a trade imbalance; or
cancel outstanding debts. In practice, none of these options is as simple as
it might sound. Simply sending cash, for instance, gives the grantor no
assurance that the money will get into the intended hands and be spent on
the intended purpose. 1' 4 In addition, various methods of grant, loan,
capitalization, or investment require complicated accounting procedures
and implicate domestic tax codes and securities regulations. They may
spawn new administrative bureaucracies, and frequently they have political
and economic consequences that reach far beyond the transaction. Grantor
nations must consider these factors in designing international environmen-
tal assistance programs.
There are two basic components to any such program: (1) implemen-
tation-how to get the funds, goods, and services to the beneficiary
country; and (2) funding. In the case of environmental aid to Poland there
is only one realistic method of implementation: the common channels of
international trade. However, there are several realistic funding options,
including outright grants, debt-relief schemes, and some new internation-
al/multilateral environmental clean-up fund.
A. Implementation: Technology Transfers and International Trade
Any environmental aid package to Poland must use the common
channels of international trade. This may seem counterintuitive, given the
"latent conflict" between international trade, which depends on the ex-
ploitation of comparative cost advantages and free access to markets, and
environmental protection, which inevitably intervenes in those markets. 05
Nevertheless, private companies are in a unique position to provide the
technology, equipment, and expertise to clean up and protect the environ-
103. By "plausible," I mean strategies that nay achieve the effect intended. Of course,
there are no limits on ways states might spend money abroad recklessly.
104. Sometimes this cannot be guaranteed even though extensive precatltions are taken.
For example, much of the food airlifted into Ethiopia never made it out of the warehouses
to drought-stricken, starving people. See, e.g., 0. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRoNMENT 158 (1989).
105. Rehbinder, Environmental Protection and the Law of International Trade, in
ACADtMIE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, L'AVENrR Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT 357, 357 (1984).
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ment. According to a UN study, "[T]he transnational corporation is today
probably the dominant institution transferring environmental management
technology across national borders."'1 And most importantly, Poland has
no environmental industries of its own. Most funds it receives from
Western governments to finance environmental protection will inevitably
be spent abroad purchasing technologies, expertise, and construction
materials.
Simply speaking, international technology transfers and other forms
of commercial environmental assistance require only four things: demand;
supply; access to markets; and capital. East-central Europe certainly has
the demand. It "lags decades behind Western Europe and North America
in environmental technology.'1 1 According to US Energy Secretary W.
Henson Moore, the potential market for US environmental technologies in
Poland alone exceeds $1 billion.108 Today that market is open.
Throughout east-central Europe, trade barriers are coming down.
Countries are in the process (at various stages) of establishing market-
based economies and convertible currencies.' °9 They are writing new laws
to facilitate trade and investment. For example, Poland now permits com-
plete foreign ownership of business enterprises and unrestricted joint ven-
tures.110 Under a treaty signed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki and US
106. United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, EnvironmentalAspects of
the Activities of Transnational Corporations: A Survey, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/55, U.N. Sales
No. E.85.1.A.11, at 61 (1985) [hereinafter UATC Survey]. These technology flows take
several forms.
The more direct transmission channels include technology embodied in new
investments, transfers, and training of environmental personnel, flows of tech-
nology bulletins and trend letters, licensing of control processes and systems,
direct sales of products and services, and so forth. Indirectly, through the effects
of observation, imitation, emulation and demonstration, transnational corpora-
tions appear to be stimulating the diffusion and adoption of pollution control
technology internationally by other industrial firms and Governments.
Id.
107. Vast Markets for Environmental Technology Exists in East, But Funds Lacking,
Expert Says, [Current Reports] 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 592 (1989). This is true not only
for environmental technologies, but for consumer and industrial technologies as well. See
CIA REPORT, supra note 80, at 26.
108. Paquette, Polish Coal Project Draws Strong Response, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH
FEDERAL LANDS, June 4, 1990, at 1 (NEXIS, Omni file). Presumably, the Energy Secretary
was estimating only the value of the technologies, not the total potential profits for US
environmental businesses in Poland.
109. Only six months after its austerity measures took effect on January 1, 1990,
Poland's Solidarity government announced that it had completed transformation to a
market-based economy. By the beginning of June 1990, 90 percent of prices were free to
fluctuate according to supply and demand, the zloty had been made a convertible currency,
the state budget was balanced, and inflation had been cut to 4 percent. See Market
Conversion, supra note 96.
110. See, e.g., CIA REPORT, supra note 80, at 10.
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President George Bush in March 1990, Poland has eased repatriation of
profits for US companies doing business in Poland. The treaty also
protects US investments there from expropriation and sets standards for
protecting intellectual property that, according to the Bush administration,
are "among the most sophisticated in the world."'' Other east-central
European countries are beginning to follow suit. 12
Trade barriers are also coming down on the other side. For decades
the United States and other Western nations have restricted exports to the
Soviet-bloc countries of technologies, such as computers, with potential
military applications. As political and economic reforms continue in the
East, these restrictions are being relaxed. On June 6, 1990, the US House
of Representatives passed legislation that would relax US controls on
exporting computers and other advanced technologies to east-central
Europe and the Soviet Union."3 On June 7, 1990, the Coordinating Com-
mittee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), the technology watchdog
group of seventeen Westem nations, including the United States, agreed to
relax export restrictions on personal computers (up to the 386-model PCs
with data-processing speeds of up to 275 megabits per second), standard
mainframe computers for office use, transistors, and more-sophisticated
telecommunications equipment."4 For its part, the Polish government has
"expressed a willingness" to protect Western high-technology items from
diversion to military uses or unauthorized destinations (read, the Soviet
Union) by establishing CoCom-type export controls.15 The relaxation of
computer export restrictions should help Poland's environmental clean-up
efforts, as many larger projects, such as sewage treatment facilities, rely on
computers for steering and control." 6 In most other respects, environmen-
tal protection and reclamation is not too high-tech dependent; any remain-
ing Western export restrictions should not greatly affect the flow of pollu-
tion-control and clean-up technologies to Poland.
111. White House Fact Sheet on the Poland-United States Business and Economic
Treaty, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 453 (Mar. 21, 1990). The treaty specifies that US
investors in Poland will be treated the same as Polish investors or investors from other
countries, whichever is more favorable, and any foreign investment disputes will be
internationally arbitrated. Id.
112. See CIA REPORT, supra note 80, at 11-21.
113. H.R. 4653, 101stCong., 2dSess., 136 CONG. REc. 683,685 (1990). This bill would
reduce bureaucratic red tape and also reportedly curb the President's discretion over foreign
policy. For this reason, the White House strongly objected to the bill's passage. See White
House Objects, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, § A, at 6, col. 5.
114. Riding, US. to Relax Standards on High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990,
§ A, at 6, col. 5.
115. CIA REPORT, supra note 80, at 28.
116. Computer technology is also crucial for energy conservation. See Boyes, Eastern
Europe on Brink of High Technology Revolution, Times, June 5, 1990 (NExIs, Omni file).
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With environmental technologies and services in great demand and
markets open, the West certainly can supply the goods: The US environ-
mental industry is worth $80 billion a year,117 more than 200 West German
companies today manufacture pollution-control equipment, technologies
for environmental management have become a substantial feature of
Japanese foreign trade, and "Swedish companies are among the leading
world suppliers of advanced pollution control equipment and know-
how.""' For at least the next two decades pollution-control companies
from these countries will be vying for potentially lucrative contracts to
clean up east-central Europe.
The only remaining question is how Poland and other east-central
European nations can afford environmental technology transfers and inter-
national trade. The clear answer is, of course, that they cannot afford it-at
least, not now. 19 Trade and technology transfers must be subsidized either
by direct grants from exporting countries or by some other form of financ-
ing, such as debt conversion. 120 As an isolated solution to Poland's en-
vironmental crisis, technology transfers must fail. By the same token, any
funding schemes that provide Poland with capital for environmental
projects are certain to lead to increased opportunities for foreign companies
because Poland has no environmental industries of its own.
B. Financing Environmental Assistance
The international community can finance environmental assistance
either directly by funding Polish environmental programs, or indirectly by
providing basic economic aid to increase production and raise the standard
of living. Even nonenvironmental investment is bound to have positive
environmental effects in the long run. Studies have shown a direct correla-
tion between per capita income and environmental protection; as income
rises, so does the propensity to allocate resources for environmental pur-
poses.12' Over time, as foreign investment brings increased production, per
capita income in Poland should rise, putting the Polish government in a
better position to spend money on the environment. However, given the
present abysmal state of Poland's economy, it will undoubtedly be a long
117. Taylor, Behind the Toxic Curtain: Firms Could Clean Up in E. Europe, Wash.
Times, July 10, 1990, § A, at 1 (NEXIS, Omni file).
118. UNTC Survey, supra note 106, at 63.
119. On Poland's economic plight, see supra Section M.
120. On financing schemes for technology transfers and international environmental
trade, see infra Section IV.B.
121. See Walter & Ungelow, Environmental Policies in Developing Countries, 8
AMBIO, at 102 (1979); UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv.. 1 ENvIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1979); see also UNTC Survey, supra note 106, at 22-23.
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time before per capita income reaches a point where the country can afford
to invest in environmental protection. Direct international environmental
investment would operate much more quickly, and under present environ-
mental circumstances in Poland, time is of the essence.
Countries can finance environmental assistance one of four ways: (1)
they can provide direct grants-in-aid; (2) they can lend Poland the funds,
either government-to-government or through multilateral development
banks (MDBs); (3) they can relieve (forgive or convert to equity) some of
Poland's existing debt burden; or (4) they can create a multilateral funding
pool for this and future environmental crises.
1. Direct Grants ofAid
Direct grants are relatively uncomplicated, since the grantor nation
gives funds directly to the beneficiary nation with or without strings
attached. Such simple assistance requires no legion of lawyers and bankers
to execute. Beneficiary nations will obviously favor this scheme because
it places few or no burdens on them. However, it usually is a more
expensive financing scheme for grantor nations than other options, such as
debt relief.122 In addition, grant monies can be easily diverted to other,
unintended purposes. The grantor nation can prevent this by administering
the funds itself within the beneficiary country. 123
2. Loans
Environmental clean-up can be financed by loans from abroad. Bar-
ber Conable, President of the World Bank, has already proposed a new
annual $300-400 million environment fund, financed by Western nations
and administered by the World Bank, to provide loans for protecting
biological diversity, reforesting, preventing climatic change, and promot-
ing energy efficiency.'12 For the grantor countries, this is, theoretically, a
low-cost way of providing assistance; any loans are expected to be repaid
with interest. But, as the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s
illustrated, when debtor countries cannot afford to meet their debt repay-
ment obligations, creditor nations have little recourse.'l 5 Additionally,
beneficiary/debtor countries might question further depleting already ex-
hausted reserves of hard currency at the expense of capital investment and
122. See infra Section IV.B.3.
123. This is, in effect, what the United States has done with funds it has granted to
Poland for environmental assistance. See infra Sections V.B.2 and V.B.3.
124. See Clover, Britain Urged to Back Pollution Clean-up Loans, Daily Telegraph,
June 16, 1990, at 6 (NEXIS, Omni file).
125. See generally Comment, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin
American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 89 (1988).
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economic growth to finance loans for pollution control.126 As investment
and economic growth decline, so does the debtor nation's ability to make
payments on outstanding debts. Ultimately, it is highly doubtful that any
nation would take on significant new debt to finance (relatively) economi-
cally unproductive environmental clean-up. On the other hand, highly
polluted countries may be willing to use existing debt to finance environ-
mental projects; for example, through debt-for-nature swaps or debt-for-
giveness. With $40 billion in foreign debts, Poland is a natural candidate
for debt-relief financing.
3. Debt Relief Schemes
a. Debt-for-Nature Swaps
First proposed in 1984, and first executed in Bolivia in 1987, debt-for-
nature swaps have quickly become popular with the international environ-
mental community as a way to conserve natural resources while alleviating
developing nations' debt burdens. According to one report, between 1987
and 1989 debt-for-nature swaps reduced foreign debts by $85 million.127
According to US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Chief William
Reilly, a supporter of debt-for-nature swaps, "They make more than a
marginal contribution to conserving what remains of the rich flora and
fauna and natural systems of debt-burdened countries."'
Debt-for-nature swaps work this way: A private commercial bank,
recognizing the impaired nature of the debt paper it owns, agrees to sell it
at a discount or donate it to an international environmental group. That
group then transfers the debt paper to a local environmental organization
within the debtor country, which assigns the paper to its government in
exchange for local currency or interest-bearing bonds. The proceeds are
administered and invested in local environmental projects. 29 Alternative-
ly, the debtor nation, in exchange for the debt, may set aside conservation
parks and areas of sustainable use, placing them under control of the local
environmental organization.
Up to now, the range of debt-for-nature swaps has been rather limited.
They have only been used to create conservation areas that protect against
126. See, e.g., Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits,
CommercialBanks, and Developing States, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 233, 236 (1990).
127. Regin, U.S. Calls for More Conservation Schemes For Debtor Countries, Reuters
Libr. Rep., Nov. 2, 1989 (NEXIS, Omni file).
128. Id.
129. See Lachman, Debt-for-Nature Swaps:A Case Study in TransactionalNegotiation,
2 J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 139, 143 (1989).
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environmental degradation and resource depletion.130 They have never
been used to finance environmental clean-up or emission reductions.
Presumably, this is because environmental organizations are not in the
business of environmental clean-up. However, environmental organiza-
tions could conceivably use the proceeds from a debt-for-nature exchange
to purchase environmental clean-up from private companies engaged in
that business.
Even so, it is doubtful if debt-for-nature swaps can provide enough
debt relief for really large debtor nations, such as Poland or Brazil.' A
typical swap involves "modest sums" between $1 million and $5 million.3 2
Even proponents of debt-for-nature swaps admit that all the swaps under-
taken so far have had a "negligible impact" on debt reduction.,"
For debtor nations, debt-for-nature swaps are, at best, a mixed bless-
ing. On the positive side, they relieve the debtor nation's burden of debt
servicing. As foreign debt is reduced, interest payments decrease cor-
respondingly. Hard currencies dedicated to make those payments are freed
for capital investment and economic growth.13 However, the debtor nation
pays a high price for this relief. Invariably, as local currency is exchanged
for the debt paper, the money supply increases, spurring inflation. 35 The
debtor government can float bonds to protect against inflation' 36 but this
changes the debt-for-nature swap into a debt-for-debt exchange. Instead of
international debt, the government winds up making payments on an
internal debt, which is often more expensive because interest rates are
usually higher on the domestic debt market. 37 However, unlike interna-
tional debts, internal debts can be repaid in local currency. If the difference
130. For a review of previous debt-for-nature swaps, see Chamberlin, Gruson &
Weltchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 415, 441-45 (1988).
131. In November 1989 the leader of a major Brazilian environmental organization
concluded that debt conversions could neither relieve Brazil's debt burden significantly nor
save the tropical rain forests. See Debt-for-Nature SwapsNot Applicable to Brazil, Ecologist
Says, Reuters Bus. Rep., Nov. 3, 1989 (NExIs, Omni file).
132. Id.
133. Gibson & Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331,
412 (1990).
134. Comment, supranote 125, at 112n. 169.
135. Some commentators argue that the threat of inflation is overstated. They claim
that the effect is precisely the same as with any new foreign investment. See Comment,
supra note 125, at 121.
136. Bond financing of debt purchases should avoid inflation because the funds are
already in the money supply. Private citizens purchase the bonds, and the government uses
the proceeds to purchase the debt paper. See Shubin & Gibby, The Promotion ofDebt-Equity
Swaps in Latin America: A Survey of the Regulatory Regimes and the International Policy
Framework, 20 U. MIAMI INTER -AM. L. REv. 31, 70-71 (1988).
137. Id. at71.
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in value between the local currency and some hard currency, such as the US
dollar, is wide enough, this may offset the differential in interest rates.
The debtor nation can avoid both internal debt and inflation if, instead
of purchasing the debt paper from the local environmental organization, it
simply cedes lands to the organization for conservation. This option may
implicate questions of sovereignty and democratic governance. 138 Never-
theless, debtor nations may well prefer to cede control over a limited
expanse of property to a local, nonprofit organization, rather than deplete
its reserves of hard currency servicing foreign debts.
The private commercial banks benefit from debt-for-nature swaps in
many ways. Carrying and continually restructuring precarious debts is an
onerous burden that interferes with banks' abilities to attract new capital.
Donating or selling off discounted debt paper to environmental organiza-
tions relieves banks of this burden and enables them to enter new, safer
lending agreements.1 39 Any losses from selling or donating the old debts
may be offset by US Treasury Department Revenue Ruling 87-124, which
allows banks a full cost-basis deduction on debts they donate to charitable
purposes, including debt-for-nature swaps.14°
Not surprisingly, environmental groups are the most vociferous
proponents of debt-for-nature swaps. For them, such schemes are a posi-
tive boon, providing political and economic clout at home while improving
links with the environmental community abroad. 41 However, these swaps
are not cost-free even for them. The transaction costs involved in design-
ing and implementing a debt-for-nature swap can be very high; they are
complex arrangements, requiring the involvement of bankers, lawyers, and
debt specialists. 42
138. This is no mere theoretical problem. In Bolivia, Conservation International, a local
environmental group that gained control over some territory under a debt-for-nature swap,
failed to consult with local residents about the economic and cultural effects of controlling
land use. Inevitably, its administration of the territory outraged indigenous groups depend-
ent upon the forest for food and fuel, causing problems for the Bolivian government. See
Burton, supra note 126, at 241-43. In addition, there is a question of how much control over
lands and resources an environmental organization obtains from the government in a swap.
According to a resolution of the UN General Assembly, states always retain sovereignty
over natural resources; governments cannot cede sovereign authority. G.A. Res. 1803
(1962), reprinted in 9 UN=rE NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 107 (D. Djonovich ed. 1974)
[hereinafter G.A.Res. 1803].
139. Shubin & Gibby, supra note 136, at 41-42. By eliminating undesirable loans, a
bank improves its short-term liquidity, enabling it to enter new agreements. Id. at 63.
140. Comment, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation ofDebt-for-
Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 721, 724-25 (1989).
141. Lachman, supra note 130, at 146.
142. For example, it took eight months to forge a Bolivian debt-for-nature exchange.




Another funding option, which seems to have been forgotten in all the
hoopla surrounding debt-conversion schemes, is outright debt-forgiveness.
In fact, the debt-for-nature swap could be converted to de facto debt-for-
giveness simply by cutting out the "middlemen," that is, the local and
international environmental organizations. These third parties serve no
necessary purpose in the transaction; 143 banks receive the same tax breaks
whether they donate the debt to an environmental organization or directly
to the debtor government for charitable purposes.'" This would presumab-
ly reduce transaction costs, increasing efficiency. The debtor country
receives all the benefits of debt relief directly without having to cede any
control over its economy or lands to special interests. Freed from having
to pay a third party for the debt paper, the government is not forced to
choose between inflation and domestic debt to finance the transaction.
Direct donation also allows the debtor to spend or conserve the savings as
it sees fit, within limitations stipulated in the debt forgiveness agreement.
Although debt-forgiveness has financial consequences for creditor
banks similar to those of debt-for-nature swaps, banks may not like the idea
of debt-forgiveness for fear that it might promote the perception that
international debt obligations are not binding. Banks do not want to create
the impression that they will capitulate whenever a debtor nation has
problems making payments. But plans to forgive debt can be formulated
to avoid this problem. Instead of completely forgiving the debt, the bank
might simply adjust its books to reflect the true value of the debt, that is,
what it would fetch on the secondary market. 45 This way, the debt and the
debtor nation's obligations under it would be maintained, but repayments
on the reduced debt would not be nearly so burdensome. For example,
Poland currently owes about $9 billion (book value) to commercial banks.
If the banks wrote down the debt to its current value on the secondary
market-approximately 17 percent of book value, or less than $1.5 bil-
lion-Poland's payments would be vastly reduced.146
143. Often, however, they do serve a most valuable purpose. Environmental organiza-
tions are usually the instigators of debt-for-nature swaps. They are typically responsible for
designing the swaps, bringing the other parties together, and implementing plans. Without
their energy, enthusiasm, and catalytic effect, banks and debtor nations might never come
together to complete a debt-for-nature swap. Nevertheless, debtor nations would have much
to gain from establishing their own intragovernmental organizations to design, implement,
and administer swaps.
144. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
145. Presumably, this "donation" of some of the value of the debt would still qualify
for a tax break under Revenue Ruling 87-124.
146. See Polish Debt Talks Held, supra note 79.
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c. Debts Owed to Governments
Debt-conversion schemes, such as the debt-for-nature swap, were
devised to reduce international debts owed to private commercial banks.
The MDBs (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF])
are prohibited by their charters from selling or donating debts.'47 Govern-
ments, for political reasons, usually do not donate or sell debt paper to
private interests. However, fully 75 percent of Poland's international debt
is owed directly to Western governments and the MDBs. To take advantage
of these additional sources of financing, the US Congress, as part of the
Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, authorized the presi-
dent to sell Polish debt paper to private parties. 4
8
In any case, sovereigns do not act like commercial creditors; any
actions taken to alleviate these public debts will not be motivated so much
by economics as by politics. This makes it more difficult to predict what
creditor states might do. However, they certainly can restructure or forgive
debts to fund environmental clean-up and protection.
4. International/Multilateral Environmental Clean-Up and Compensation
Funds
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many nations enacted environmental
damage funds to accomplish a wide array of environmental purposes-
from cleaning up hazardous waste in the United States,49 to compensation
for pollution-related health damages in Japan, 50 to controlling noise pollu-
tion in France.'
Environmental damage funds have also been employed in the interna-
tional arena. In 1971 the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a
diplomatic organization empowered to regulate international shipping and
other industries affecting the international marine community, promul-
gated the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage (Compensation Fund). 52
For the past twenty years, this Compensation Fund has provided relief to
147. See Gibson & Curtis, supra note 133, at 386.
148. Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5414(b) (1989).
149. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, (CERCLA) Pub. L. No. 96-510, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1988).
150. Law No. 111 of October 5, 1973, amended by Law No. 85 of 1974. See Thiem,
Environmental Damage Funds, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, COMPENSATION FOR POLLUTnON DAMAGE 144, 156-61 (1981).
151. D6cret No. 73-193 of February 13, 1973. See Thiem, supra note 150, at 166-68.
152. Conference Statement, The Establishment of an International Compensation Fund
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 at 706-28, U.N. Sales No. 78.06.E (1978) (Inter-Governmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization Official Records) [hereinafter Compensation Fund].
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victims of oil spills in territorial waters of contracting countries. The IMO
has been unable to replicate this success in more recent efforts to control
hazardous waste pollution at sea."' Apparently, the environmental damage
fund is not adaptable to all political, economic, and environmental situa-
tions.
a. Environmental Clean-Up and Compensation Fund Models
There are two basic types of environmental damage funds: (1) those
designed to clean up environmental pollution; and (2) those created to
provide compensation for pollution-related injuries. The US Superfund is
an example of the first type; the IMO's Compensation Fund is an example
of the second.
The US Superfund was designed specifically to clean up hazardous-
waste sites nationwide. It is a $1.6 billion trust fund financed largely by
taxes on, among other things, petroleum imports, gasoline, chemical
feedstock, and waste management.'M The Superfund is administered by
the EPA. In any given case, the government attempts to force parties
responsible for the waste site to clean it, or can reclaim the site itself using
Superfund monies. The Superfund can then seek indemnification from the
polluters under the statute's liability provisions. 55
In the first six years of Superfund's operation (from 1980 to 1986),
703 hazardous-waste sites were placed on the National Priorities List
compiled by the EPA. By 1986 the EPA and various states had conducted
engineering studies at 70 percent of the listed sites. The EPA had com-
mitted to funding construction at 137 of them, and fourteen of the nation's
most heavily polluted hazardous-waste sites were already cleaned up and
removed from the National Priorities List. 156 By 1988 the EPA had spent
nearly $1.5 billion of Superfund monies cleaning up hazardous waste.'57
Of these monies, the agency had recovered $230 million, and was expect-
ing to recover an additional $824 million through settlement or prosecution
under Superfund's civil liability provisions.' The US General Account-
ing Office has predicted that Superfund will be cleaning up priority sites
153. See generally Comment, Dead in the Water: International Law, Diplomacy, and
Compensation for Chemical Pollution at Sea, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1986).
154. See, e.g., Ways and Means Superfund Fact Sheet, 29 TAx NOTES 397, 397-98
(1985).
155. Orloff, Private Enforcement of Superfund, NAT. RES. & ENv'T, Fall 1985, at 29,
30.
156. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND: A Six YEAR PERSPECTIVE 1
(1987).
157. See J. P. AcroN, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND, A PROGRESS REPORT viii (1989).
158. Id.
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until the year 2017, at a projected cost of between (1983 dollars) $6.3 and
$39.1 billion."5 9
Unlike the US Superfund, the IMO's 1971 Oil Pollution Compensa-
tion Fund is not designed to clean up polluted environments; it is designed
to redress injuries caused by pollution. This type of fund responds to a
basic problem of ordinary tort liability, wherein the right of compensation
rests on a plaintiff's ability to identify a defendant and prove legal respon-
sibility under some recognized cause of action such as negligence or
nuisance. In environmental cases these burdens often prove insuperable.
Individual polluters are difficult to identify, the source of the pollution can
be literally hundreds of miles from where the injury occurs, and in cases
with many victims compensation for any single victim is usually inade-
quate. Compensation funds have eased plaintiffs' burdens by guaranteeing
redress on a showing of pollution-related damages; even in cases where the
polluter cannot be identified, victims can be compensated from the fund."0
Environmental compensation funds, such as the IMO's, are typically
financed by a levy on potential polluters, with assessments based on the
risk posed by a given activity or product of manufacture. In effect, com-
pensation funds amount to a compulsory insurance system for potential
polluters,16 1 but the "insurance policy" does not relieve polluters of civil
liability for the damages they cause. If it did, polluters would have no
disincentive to pollute, and the goal of providing environmental protection
would be undermined. To avoid this, legislation on compensation funds
usually includes liability provisions that guarantee that polluters retain
individual responsibility for the injuries they cause. 62 For example, the
IMO's Compensation Fund provides for civil penalties of up to $14 million
against polluters. The Fund automatically kicks in when damage claims
exceed the $14 million liability limit or when the shipowner is either
insolvent or unidentified. The Fund recognizes claims by any injured
person who is a citizen of a member state, regardless of whether the
damage was the result of negligence or an act of God.1 63 In its first ten years
of operation (to 1982) more than $1 billion (1982 US) worth of compensa-
159. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WAS-
TEs: AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES iii (1985).
160. However, most environmental damage funds require that the victim first seek
redress from the polluter. See, e.g., the Dutch Air Pollution Fund, Art. 64 wet inzake de
Luchtverontreiniging, Stb. 1970, 580, discussed in Thiem, supra note 150, at 151-56, 172.
161. See Thiem, supra note 150, at 151-56, 172.
162. Id. at 175-77.
163. See Compensation Fund, supra note 151.
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tion claims were paid. Seventy-five percent of these monies came from
tanker owners under the IMO's liability provisions. 16'
b. Problems and Politics of Environmental Fund Implementation and
Operation
Whether the purpose of an environmental disaster fund is clean-up or
compensation, achieving agreement on its structure and substance is ex-
traordinarily difficult; political and economic pressures can be overwhelm-
ing. The US Congress took several years to hammer out a funding formula
for the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 65 and that was to renew already
existing Superfund legislation. It is incrementally more difficult to design
and implement an international or multilateral environmental damage fund
when virtually every decision implicates questions of sovereignty,
hegemony, and international trade. In 1984 the IMO discovered just how
difficult it can be when it failed in its effort to create a compensation fund
covering chemical spills at sea. 66
Further, unlike debt-relief schemes and other forms of more informal
(such as commercial) international assistance, environmental funds,
whether for clean-up or compensation, require special organizations to run
them. Organizations are expensive and often inefficient, "giv[ing] rise to
the rigidities and stultifying effects associated with bureaucratic be-
havior."'" The US Superfund has been severely criticized on these
grounds. According to some commentators, the EPA has used its broad
discretion under the Act and its lack of political accountability to do
"virtually nothing.' ' 6
Such organizations are also subject to influence by the industries they
were established to regulate. For example, the IMO's decisions on com-
pensation for oil pollution are greatly influenced by shipowners. 169 Ad-
ministrative organizations are also subject to financial "blackmail" by the
countries that supply their operating budgets. For instance, Japan and Italy
together supply 48 percent of the IMO's Compensation Fund.70 Should
either of these countries withdraw financial support, the Fund would be
164. Shipping Official Says Pollution Claims Create 'Heavy Burden' For Tanker
Owners, [Current Reports] 5 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 299 (1982) [hereinafter Heavy Burden].
165. See 0. YouNG, supra note 104, at 158.
166. See generally Comment, supra note 153.
167. 0. YouNG, supra note 104, at 38.
168. Note, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
875, 882 (1986).
169. Heavy Burden, supra note 164.
170. Prospects Improving that US. Will Join Pollution Compensation Fund, Official
Says, [Current Reports] 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 240 (1985).
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rendered ineffective. Theoretically, Japan and Italy can dictate policy to
the IMO and influence decision making.17 1
These problems would be magnified in designing and implementing
an international environmental clean-up fund. For one thing, such a fund
would need to be many times larger than any existing fund. To illustrate,
the IMO's 1971 Compensation Fund is restricted to compensating for
injuries caused by one type of environmental accident, oil spills at sea. The
total amount this fund can pay out is (1982 US) $48.5 million per incident.
A general pollution clean-up fund, by contrast, should cover the widest
possible array of environmental problems-everything from deforestation
caused by acid rain to nuclear accidents. It would need a budget large
enough to cover multiple incidents in the hundreds of billions of dollars-
cleaning up pollution in east-central Europe alone is conservatively es-
timated to require $500 billion over the next twenty years.172 This is more
than ten times what the US General Accounting Office expects Superfund
to cost over the next thirty years.'"
Such a huge fund would be nearly impossible to finance. Unlike the
IMO's Pollution Convention, for example, it could not be primarily sup-
ported by liability assessments (i.e., by the polluters themselves). Often,
most notably in east-central Europe, the former socialist governments were
the polluters. Holding the Communist parties liable would be problematic
since they are no longer in power and, in most east-central European
countries, no longer exist. However, in other cases, holding governments
liable should not prove an insurmountable difficulty. To the extent
countries can afford it, they should be forced to finance their own environ-
mental clean-up. If they cannot afford clean-up costs, they could be treated
like insolvent shipowners under the IMO's Compensation Fund, which
automatically kicks in to make up any shortfall. 174 In the present case,
however, this might not be feasible. Virtually all the highly polluted
east-central European countries are nearly insolvent. Consequently, the
environmental clean-up fund would have to pick up most, if not all, of the
$500 billion bill. And we are right back where we started on the funding
question.
Nevertheless, some slim hope remains for an international environ-
mental clean-up fund sometime in the future. The prospect of dozens of
171. Of course, their authority is limited by the consequences of withholding financial
support; they would lose the right to compensation from the Fund for oil spills within their
territorial waters.
172. Taylor, supra note 117.
173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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environmental crises around the world, all costing billions of dollars to
clean up, should eventually prompt the international community toward a
long-term multilateral solution. Theoretically, as the number of high-cost
environmental assistance demands increase, political obstacles to agree-
ment should diminish. At some point the costs of attaining an international
convention will be lower than the costs, for each nation individually, of
failing.
V. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE
A. Altruism, Humanitarianism, Moral Obligation, and Self-Inter-
est: An Introduction to International Environmental Assistance
Each financing and assistance scheme discussed in the preceding
section offers the Polish people some hope of cleaner water and more-
healthful air. But the fact that Poland needs the help does not necessarily
mean it will receive help. To the Polish people, this is axiomatic; if states
ever act altruistically or from a sense of moral obligation, they have rarely,
if ever, done so where Poland is concerned. In addition, there is no
precedent for the type of assistance Poland seeks. 175 International environ-
mental programs typically concern agreements to avert prospective harm
or to regulate transboundary resources and pollution. There is a significant
transboundary component to this case, 176 and Poland would like to avert
further harm; but the type of international assistance sought here is more in
the nature of disaster relief, as for an immense earthquake or widespread
starvation from a decade-long drought.
Natural disasters typically bring quick humanitarian assistance from
the international community; nations momentarily put politics aside and
rush emergency aid to innocent disaster victims. However, Poland's dis-
aster is not "natural." No act of God polluted Poland's lands, air, and
water; it was the former Polish governments that did this. The nations of
the world do not ordinarily put politics aside to send humanitarian relief to
a country that has created its own disaster. 177 On the other hand, the party
substantially responsible for creating Poland's ecological crisis is no longer
in power-in fact, that party no longer exists in Poland.78 The liberal
175. The 1986 accident at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, Soviet Union, may be
an exception. Like Poland's present crisis, it was an ecological catastrophe that required
international financial and technical assistance.
176. See infra notes 184-185, 188-189 and accompanying text.
177. Again, Chernobyl may be an exception.
178. The Polish United Workers party, known in the United States as the Communist
party, voted to disband on January 29, 1990. At the same time, many former Communists
founded a new left-of-center party, the Social Democrats. Greenhouse, Upheaval in the
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democracies of the West may be more willing to grant humanitarian
assistance to the fledgling democratic government in Poland and to the
Polish people, who had no say in the administrations that fouled their lands;
in this respect, the present situation is analogous to that of West Germany
following World War II when the United States extended Marshall Plan
assistance.
In any case, it would be sheer folly to assume that other nations will
lend assistance from purely humanitarian motives. Better to assume that
they will not give aid at all unless motivated by self-interest, which requires
that international assistance yields some political or economic benefit, or
benefits of both kinds. This may or may not involve a precise cost-benefit
analysis, but the grantor nation must perceive that it is getting something of
value in return for its assistance.
The price of assistance includes opportunity costs (what else the
government might have done with its limited resources), the costs of
making the transaction, and any negative political fallout for the state's
decision makers. The benefits from assistance may include economic
profits derived from increased opportunity for foreign investment, savings
in defense spending resulting from reduced international tensions, a
broadened sphere of political influence, and any positive domestic political
effect for the decision makers.
Political ramifications occur at both the domestic and international
levels. At home, some extremely unpopular international actions con-
ceivably could cost the party in power the next election. In the present
case, by contrast, US assistance to the new democratic Polish government
is facilitated by the existence of a large bloc of Polish-American voters.
Internationally, unpopular actions, such as aggressive military activities or
refusal to comply with international trade regimes, can make the state a
pariah, ostracized by the international community and barred from par-
ticipating in multilateral regimes that provide political and economic
benefits. Inevitably, the international reaction will have political and
economic ramifications at home as well.
B. Present Environmental Assistance to Poland: National,
Regional, and Global Perspectives
Fortunately, there is no question that the international community is
willing to help Poland resuscitate its economy and convert it to a market
base. So far, the Western industrialized nations and the MDBs have




pledged to send approximately $9 billion in general economic assistance to
Poland. 79 A fraction of these funds, about $200 million, is earmarked for
environmental reclamation and protection. 80 Given the magnitude of the
Polish environmental crisis,' the aid promised so far, although laudable,
is only a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, at least the question has
changed; it is no longer a matter of if, but only how and how much the
international community is willing to help.
The answer to these questions depends largely on the economic and
political consequences for the grantor nations, consequences that are de-
pendent upon strategy. Debt-relief financing, for example, would have
different results in Poland, and entail different consequences for the grantor
nations, than direct grants-in-aid. In addition, any single strategy can be
expected to affect different grantor nations differently. Without an accept-
able multilateral scheme, grantor nations will choose environmental assis-
tance and funding formulae based on their individual interests.
A pattem has already emerged. Some countries, such as Germany and
Sweden, appear to view environmental assistance as an investment that will
ultimately benefit domestic environmental industries. Other countries,
including the United States and Japan, seem less certain of the Polish
markets. These countries tend to support debt conversion as a means of
financing environmental assistance, rather than debt-forgiveness or out-
fight grants. Most other Westem governments, including Great Britain,
France, and the European Community, have adopted strategies somewhere
in the middle.
1. Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia: Aggressive Marketing
Since the Mazowiecki government came to power in August 1989,
West Germany has been an ardent supporter, promising more financial
assistance than any other country. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government
has promised more than US$2 billion in general economic assistance. In
addition, Germany has offered to forgive $277 million in Polish debts for
environmental projects.1 82 This seemingly generous German assistance is
a predictable (although none the less generous for that) consequence of
economics, politics, geography, and history.
Specifically, Germany expects many of the funds it invests in Polish
environmental clean-up to return home through German environmental
179. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
180. See Ember, supra note 49, at 14.
181. See supra Section II.
182. Tamoff, Eastern Europe and the Environment, CBS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at
29-30.
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companies. This expectation is well-founded. German environmental
companies, among the most advanced and aggressive in the world, have
been setting up shop in Poland ever since it opened for business in 1989 and
have settled in for the long haul.183
Geography is another strong incentive for German assistance. Ger-
many and Poland are central European neighbors. Berlin is only 320 miles
from Warszawa; Mdnchen (Munich) is only 316 miles from Wroclaw-
less than the distance between Boston and Philadelphia. Among other
things, the German and Polish peoples share drainage basins and the Baltic
Sea. Ultimately, pollution from one country affects the other. German air
pollution has been a significant factor in Poland's environmental plight;
according to Polish government figures, hundreds of thousands of tons of
S02 drift from German factories to landfall in Poland each year.14 On the
other hand, the sheer volume of Polish emissions overcomes the prevailing
westerly winds, spilling over to the West and North. 5 Politically, German
aid to Poland helps to ease Polish concerns over German reunification.
Like Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries are aggres-
sively pursuing environmental opportunities in Poland and providing
generous economic support. Most of the US$55 million pledged to Poland
by Sweden is earmarked for environmental projects 8 6 and Finland has
offered to forgive US$22.5 million in Polish debt if Poland agrees to
dedicate the funds to environmental purposes and Finnish companies are
awarded pollution-control contracts."
The Baltic countries have an extra incentive to help reduce pollution
in Poland. Up to 75 percent of emissions emanating from Polish smoke-
stacks drift north to landfall in Scandinavia and the USSR,' and Poland's
rivers have turned the Baltic Sea into one of the most polluted bodies of
water in the world.8 9 Already, Sweden's Kemira group is involved in
constructing a water purification plant on the Wisla River near
Warszawa.' 90
183. Eastern European Market Ripe for Investment by U.S. Environmental Firms,
CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, Apr. 16, 1990, at 10 [hereinafter Eastern Europe].
184. Papuzinska, Szybowanie czerni (The BlackSail), Gazeta Wyborcza, May 14, 1990,
at 4 (trans. by author).
185. News and Analysis, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10096 (1983).
186. See Marsh & Burton, E. Europe Crisis Feared by Walesa, Fin. Times, Sept. 8,
1989, at 12 (NEXIS, Omni file).
187. See Maremont, Kapstein & Schares, Eastern Europe's Big Cleanup, Bus. WEEK,
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2. The American and Japanese Perspectives: "He Who Hesitates Is Lost"
Like Germany and the Scandinavian countries, the United States has
large and advanced environmental industries, worth $80 billion a year.' 91
However, US companies have not been flocking to Poland. In the spring
of 1990, when many central and northern European environmental com-
panies were already open for business in Poland, their US counterparts
were still "investigating the potential.' 19 2 By July 1990, when a few US
environmental companies finally announced plans to set up shop in east-
central Europe, industry analysts remained skeptical, wondering who
would pay and in what currencies. 93 With respect to Poland and Hungary,
the concem over currencies shows that US environmental industry analysts
have not been following events very closely. The Polish zloty, for example,
has been fully convertible for months; in fact, since January 1, 1990, it has
held its value firmly against the US dollar.94 The ambivalence of the US
environmental industry simply reflects the hesitancy of the US government
to provide substantial financial support.19 5
Compared with what European governments have promised, US
funding of environmental clean-up in Poland has been meager, totalling
$45 million over three years. Under the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, the United States will spend up to $30
million over the next three years to retrofit the Skawina coal-fired power
plant in Krak6w with advanced clean-coal technology and to manufacture
or modify other industrial facilities in Poland so that they bum fossil fuels
more cleanly. 96 Congress appropriated an additional $10 million over
three years (these funds are equally available to help Hungary) to enable
the EPA to help the Polish government establish an air quality-monitoring
network and improve water quality in the Krak6w area. 97 The EPA also
191. Taylor, supra note 117.
192. Eastern European, supra note 183.
193. See Wald, Market Place; Cleaning Spills: Is It Profitable?, N.Y. Times, July 10,
1990, § D, at 8, col. 3.
194. See Engelberg, supra note 90. The question of who pays remains a real problem,
however. As east-central European countries attempt to sell off state-owned enterprises,
plant managers cannot really commit to anything, including environmental upgrading. See
Taylor, supra note 117. At the same time, the governments of these countries may not be
in a hurry to fund environmental improvements at factories that are on the selling block.
195. To the extent the United States has provided support, the environmental industry
has shown great interest. More than eighty companies entered bids for the US government
contract to supply clean-coal technology to the Skawina power plant in Krak6w, pursuant
to the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. 22 U.S.C. § 5452; See Ember,
supra note 49, at 12.
196. 22 U.S.C. § 5452. This should reduce emissions there by 50 to 60 percent. See
Ember, supra note 49, at 12.
197. So far, the EPA has proposed constructing six air-quality stations to monitor for
SO 2, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, total suspended particulates, and fine particulates.
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will provide technical and financial assistance to the Polish government for
environmental education and policy-making.9
8
There is no reason for the paltry level of US support. The Polish
government estimates that environmental clean-up will take two decades
and cost in the tens of billions of dollars;'99 for east-central Europe as a
whole, environmental clean-up is conservatively estimated to cost $500
billion.2 Even if European environmental companies possess some
geographical or other competitive advantage in these markets, there should
be room for everyone. Nevertheless, the United States seems unwilling to
make the investment. So far, US environmental assistance to Poland has
been primarily by direct grants.201 However, the Bush administration
recently informed the Polish government that it should not expect any more
direct financing for environmental projects.3 Future US support will
likely be limited to schemes to convert debt.
Since the West became aware of Poland's environmental plight in
about 1985, US politicians, environmentalists, and media have been utter-
ing the phrase debt-for-nature as if it were some incantation capable of
magically cleaning Poland's air, land, and water. US EPA Chief Reilly has
been an outspoken proponent of this debt conversion scheme? 3 In the
SEED Act of 1989 Congress gave the president authority to sell Polish debt
paper to private parties and asked specifically for a report on prospects for
debt-for-nature swaps in Poland.24 US interest in debt-for-nature swaps is
understandable. First and foremost, the swaps do not cost much, only some
lost tax revenues for the write-offs participating commercial banks
receive. 20 Swaps are popular with the environmental lobby and the public,
Four of the stations will also monitor hydrocarbon and ozone levels. These stations should
be operational by the spring of 1991. See Ember, supra note 49, at 10. The EPA also plans
to help the Poles upgrade treatment plants for drinking water at Raba and Rudawa, and
improve sewage treatment plants at Plasz6w and Mislenice. See id.
198. 22 U.S.C. § 5452.
199. See Ember, supra note 49, at 19
200. -See Taylor, supra note 117; See also Environment, Pollution in Eastern Europe
May Limit Western Investment, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), July 2, 1990, at A-5.
201. For instance, the $30 billion outlay to retrofit the Skawina power plant with
advanced clean-coal technology. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
202. See Williams, Eastern Europe Gets Environment Center; Pollution: The West
Warns it Can Pay Little of the Cost of Cleaning up the Industrial Waste and Poisons Left by
40 Years of Communist Rule, L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1990, § A, at 32, col. 1.
203. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
204. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5414(b), 5473(3)(C) (1990).
205. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. There may be an additional cost of
debt-conversion financing. To the extent that the US government fails to provide substantial
financing to Poland, in the forms of grants, et cetera, it may be discouraging domestic




and are fashionable with the media. Backing swaps is an easy way for the
Bush administration to "score points for environmental sensitivity";2 they
appear to accomplish a great deal even when they do not have much real
impact either on the debtor nation's debt standing or the environment.2
Meanwhile, US companies still sit at home awaiting signals from the
US government demonstrating confidence in the fledgling east-central
European markets. The slow start places them at a competitive disad-
vantage with central and northem European firms already established in
Poland2 and deprives the Polish government of the benefits of increased
competition and US technical expertise in environmental management.2 09
The Japanese government has also been reluctant to provide substan-
tial environmental assistance to Poland. Since April 1989 Poland has been
pleading with Japan for pollution-control equipment and technological
assistance.210 In response, the Japanese have sent delegations of environ-
mental experts to visit Poland, but not much money-only about $25
million (these funds are also available to help Hungary) out of a generous
economic aid package totaling $1 billion.21 1
3. The Polish Perspective
From Poland's point of view, international environmental assistance
should not be a matter of politics or economics, but of humanity: Pollution
is causing death, sickness, and destruction. However, the Poles are politi-
cal realists. They understand that international assistance depends, at least
to some extent, on a quid pro quo. If the relative generosity of German aid
is based on business considerations, then, in this case at least, the only thing
worse than being exploited is not being exploited. As long as Poland's
environment is improved in the process, Poland wins.
Poland is also rightly concerned with the type of assistance it receives
from the international community. Even the generous German aid is
mostly in the form of debt relief, which puts no money into the almost
empty Polish coffers. Certainly, Poland would like to take up Germany
and Finland on their debt-forgiveness offers, but the Polish government
206. Taylor, supra note 117.
207. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
208. See Eastern European, supra note 183.
209. According to the World Resources Institute, the United States still retains a
technological advantage in clean-coal technology. See Press Briefing: World Resources
Institute, Fed. Info. Systems Corp., July 6, 1989 (NEXiS, Omni file).
210. See Poland Seeks Japanese Anti-Pollution Assistance, Kyodo News Serv., Apr.
21, 1989 (NEXIS.Omni file).
211. Colitt, Kaifu Outlines Aid Package, Fin. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at 2 (NEXIS, Omni
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does not have $22.5 million (the Finnish offer), let alone $277 million (the
German offer), to spend on the environment. It had barely enough funds to
continue providing necessary services through the winter of 1990.212
Poland is even more skeptical about the type of assistance favored by
the United States, debt-for-nature swaps. The Director General of Poland's
Ministry of Finance, Stefan Kawalec, has suggested the Polish government
is not interested in pursuing debt conversion schemes, whether for environ-
mental or other purposes.213 Any plan to convert debt would force Poland
to choose its poison: pay with cash and risk inflation; or float a bond issue
and acquire high-interest debt.2 14 In addition, the cumulative economic and
environmental effects of all possible debt-for-nature conversions in Poland
would be negligible. So far, one debt-for-nature swap has been completed
in Poland, creating a wetlands preserve in a relatively unspoiled part of the
country. This otherwise laudable plan is, under the circumstances,
ridiculous. Today, when 4.6 billion tons of raw sewage are pouring annual-
ly into Polish rivers, when 95 percent of the nation's drinking water is
polluted, when two-thirds of all children in Silesia suffer serious pollution-
related mental and physical disabilities, precious funds spent to create
parks are practically wasted. Finally, if every commercial debt was extin-
212. Poland's economic problems have been exacerbated by the Persian Gulf crisis,
which began in August 1990. Poland traditionally buys 80 percent of its oil from the Soviet
Union, in rubles at cut-rate prices. The remaining supplies come from other sources such
as Iraq. Through October 1990 the Soviets had reneged on 25 percent of promised deliveries.
See Engelberg, Gas Lines Form in Poland to Beat Rising Price, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1990,
§ 1, at 17, col. 1 (late ed.); Poles Negotiate a Soviet Barter, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1990, § D,
at 6, col. 4. Starting in 1991, Poland and the other east-central European countries must
purchase Soviet oil at world prices in hard currency. This makes it even more difficult for
the Polish government to dedicate any funds on hand to environmental purposes. It also
ensures increased emissions of air pollutants as Poles bum more high-sulfur coal instead of
oil. The situation was eased slightly after Poland concluded a barter agreement with the
Soviet Union, under which the Poles would send food and tobacco to the USSR, in exchange
for natural gas. Id.
213. International Finance, Debt-Equity SwapsNotA Present Option for Poland, Says
Official, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), June 5, 1990, at A-6 (NEXIS, Omni file).
However, Kawalec was not primarily concerned with the immediate costs and benefits of
swaps; rather, he thought that Poland should not sell at low cost potentially valuable
businesses and property.
More recently, the Polish government has shown more interest in debt-for-nature
swaps. See Pudlis, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: The Business of Environmental Clean-Up,
Gazeta Int'l, Nov. 29, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
214. Of course, in a debt-for-nature swap this dilemma could be avoided if the Polish
government ceded land in exchange for the debt paper, but this raises questions of
sovereignty. Among other things, there is a question of how much control the local
environmental organization involved in the swap can actually gain over property ceded by
the government. The United Nations has recognized the principle of a "public trust," which
essentially prohibits governments from relinquishing their custody over their nations' natural
resources. See G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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guished by conversion, Poland would be left with a $31 billion debt owed
exclusively to Western governments, the World Bank, and the IMF.2 1
The Polish government naturally favors direct grants of environmen-
tal assistance, such as the $30 million that the United States will be
spending over the next three years to retrofit the Skawina coal-fired power
plant in Krak6w with advanced clean-coal technology. This method of
financing directly benefits the Polish environment without overly burden-
ing the Polish government. Dedicating the funds to a specific purpose,
rather than merely giving the cash to the Polish government, insures that
the funds cannot be diverted to other, nonenvironmental purposes. Direct
grants, such as this, are clearly advantageous both for the Polish govern-
ment and the Polish environment. Moreover, they act as a subsidy to US
environmental firms seeking to obtain a foothold in east-central Europe,
without attracting the ire of the United State's General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) partners.
4, The InternationallMultilateral Perspective
While US and German strategies for helping Poland may differ in
many respects, their interests are allied. By helping Poland now, both
countries, and the entire international community, benefit from the con-
tinued improvement in East-West relations. Any long-term relaxation in
international tensions benefits everyone by producing "peace dividends" in
the form of reduced domestic and military spending. Economically, en-
vironmental assistance to Poland acts as an indirect subsidy to domestic
companies hoping to gain a foothold in the vast new markets of east-central
Europe. Ecologically, the global community benefits whenever transboun-
dary pollution is curtailed. In a world where pollution knows no boun-
daries, no nation is immune from environmental catastrophe. Few
countries, if any, have economies sturdy enough to absorb an environmen-
tal disaster like Poland 'S.26 And no country can afford such a catastrophe
as Chemobyl, the nuclear disaster whose effects spread across an entire
continent.
In this small expanse where national interests converge lies the hope
for true multilateral action to relieve Poland's crisis and other present and
future environmental crises around the world. Already the international
215. In addition to what it owes private commercial banks, the entire $2.4 billion debt
Poland owes the US government could be converted pursuant to the SEED Act of 1989. See
supra note 78. The net effect would be about a 25 percent drop in Polish foreign debt, a
significant reduction. However, Poland would remain one of the world's leading debtor
nations.
216. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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community has taken some small steps. In February 1990 the "Group of
24" industrialized countries, which includes the United States, Japan, the
European Community countries, and Austria, is expected to allocate $60
million for environmental protection in Poland.21 7 But there is little sign of
a more substantial multilateral plan, such as an international convention on
pollution disaster relief. Arguably, given problems of size and structure,
218
such a convention is a practical impossibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, the West has grown increasingly attentive
to global and regional environmental problems. However, nothing in the
West's experience prepared it for the environmental calamities of eastern
Europe. First there was Chernobyl; then, as the iron curtain fell, the West
got its first good look at one of the chief legacies of forty years of
totalitarianism in east-central Europe: a deadly pall of black smoke, rancid
rivers, and defiled lands-in human and economic terms, a disaster every
bit as tragic as Chemobyl.
In Krak6w, Poland, one of Europe's most treasured cities, centuries-
old buildings are literally dissolving in the rain; the Wisla River that flows
through the center of town is dead; farmers in the region till poisoned soil,
growing food unfit for human consumption; and workers, children, and
other inhabitants suffer unusually high rates of respiratory and other dis-
eases. Scientists predict that by the year 2000 one-fourth of all Poles will
develop some form of pollution-related cancer. These facts are so astound-
ing as to be almost incomprehensible. In the more easily understood terms
of economics, the cost of this crisis for Poland exceeds $3 billion annually,
more than 10 percent of the gross domestic income.219 Clearly, Poland's
pollution crisis can be alleviated only with massive foreign economic and
technical assistance.
Poland represents only the peak of east-central Europe's, and the
world's, garbage heap. The total cost of cleaning up east-central Europe
could easily reach $500 billion or more. This does not include the Soviet
Union, which suffers from the same legacy as its east-central European
neighbors.21 Then there is Pakistan, with the worst industrial pollution of
217. See Poland: Business File, East European Markets, Fin. Times, Feb. 23, 1990
(NEXIS, Omni file). Of course, this group funding is in addition to funds provided by each
member country individually.
218. See supra Section IV.B.4.b.
219. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.




any Third World country;222 Mexico City and New Dehli, both shrouded in
hazardous veils of polluted air; 223 and countries throughout Africa
"threatened by degradation, population explosion, and agricultural stagna-
tion."z2
The financial and environmental assistance the West has only begun
providing to Poland is almost nothing when compared with the demands to
come. How the international community responds to Poland's needs will
set an important precedent with lessons both for grantor nations and those
requiring assistance. Even at this early stage, a few lessons are already
clear. Western governments can be counted on to provide a modicum of
humanitarian environmental aid, but more-substantial assistance depends
on prospects for some financial (or perhaps political) return. Countries
with larger, more advanced environmental industries, situated to benefit
from international funding, can generally be expected to provide greater
assistance. Needy countries can take advantage of this, as Poland has tried
to do,2 by creating political, economic, and legal climates conducive to
international environmental trade. Poland's reforms have boosted the con-
fidence of Western governments in Polish markets and promoted increased
environmental investment.
222. See, e.g., Rizvi, Pakistan: Industrial Pollution Crisis, Inter Press Serv., June 7,
1985 (NExis, Omni file).
223. See respectively Cautin, Mexico: Ambitious Goals To Confront the Environmental
Challenge, Inter Press Serv., July 13, 1990 (NExIs, Omni file);Alarming Pollution inlndian
Cities, Xinhua General Overseas News Serv., Jan. 8, 1990 (NExIs, Omni file).
224. Awaori, Africa: Donors Told To Share Environment Costs, Inter Press Serv., July
3, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
225. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
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